TACTICAL HUMINT BATTALION
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
A 14th Military Intelligence Battalion (TE) perspective on how to provide CI/HUMINToperational support to the commander in unilateral, joint, or combined military operations.
15 September 1997
Introduction: This TTP was developed by the 14th MI Battalion which was I Corps' Tactical Exploitation Battalion (TEB), subordinate to the 201st MI Brigade, stationed at Ft Lewis, WA, from 16 December 1988 - 15 September 1997. As a TEB, it was organized with Corps' Counterintelligence (CI), Interrogation Prisoner of War (IPW), and Long-Range Surveillance (LRS) assets. Over the years, the TEB has been restructured numerous times in order to achieve the right mix of intelligence assets to support the Corps. Recently, the 14th MI Battalion again reorganized its assets; this time not by an MTOE change, but through an internal realignment in order to define a better means of providing tactical and operational level CI/HUMINT support into the 21st century. However, as part of the Army's restructuring plan, two of the four Corps TEBs, the 14th MI Battalion and the 163rd MI Battalion from Ft Hood, TX, will inactivate during FY 97, leaving a gap in HUMINT support to these Corps and Major Subordinate Command (MSC) warfighters. In light of the operational landscape where Corps or Joint Task Forces (JTF) will likely be employed in the Force XXI environment, we believe this shortfall must be addressed. Whatever organization is activated to fill the gap, we hope that our efforts to define tactical CI/HUMINT operations will aid in its formation. The need for a single HUMINT organization with a common architecture to provide C2, employ and synchronize all tactical and operational CI/HUMINT assets has been clearly documented. With this in mind, we have put to paper our tactics, techniques and procedures.
Purpose: To provide tactics, techniques, and procedures for CI/HUMINT operational support to unilateral, joint or combined military operations.
Shaping the future HUMINT Battalion:
a. Traditionally the Tactical Exploitation Battalion's CI/HUMINT collection and analysis assets are spread laterally and in depth across the battlefield. Corps LRS teams operate at distances up to 150 kilometers forward of the FLOT, while CI and IPW teams deploy from the Corps rear boundary to the FLOT, a depth of another 100-150 kilometers. The operations sections for these assets also deploy to different locations: IPW Operations located at the Corps Cage, CI Operations located at the Corps Rear Tactical Operations Center (TOC), and LRS Operations located at the Corps Main. The TEB has historically operated a decentralized command and control structure, leaving the battalion's TOC to execute administrative and logistical support while providing minimal asset management of these critical intelligence collectors spread over 30,000 square kilometers. The resulting command and control structure lacked a central point from which to deconflict taskings of these limited assets, coordinate requirements, and synchronize HUMINT operations with the overall intelligence effort. The task was too great for the company operations elements functioning independently to handle. Recent training exercises and operational deployments made clear the need to produce a synchronized, concerted HUMINT effort capable of supporting and maintaining pace with military operations from stability and support deployments to high intensity combat operations. Ever since DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the execution of Information Operations to gain Information Dominance has compressed time, increased speed, and made distance virtually irrelevant on the digitized battlefield, causing the increased tempo of combat operations.1 For the traditionally less than responsive CI/HUMINT operation, a change in organization had to be made in order to produce the timely intelligence that is responsive and synchronized with combat operations. In order to achieve CI/HUMINT support that would contribute to gaining Information Dominance, the TEB had to restructure.
b. To further substantiate the need for restructuring, recent contingency deployment trends were revealing the future path -- no longer would CI and IPW deploy independently to perform separate missions. It is a common assessment of the U.S. intelligence community that given the current and projected world environment, the majority of military operations that U.S. forces will participate in will be joint or combined Stability and Support Operations (SASO); DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM might be the last conflict for the foreseeable future where a large scale Corps Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) cage will be established. During peacekeeping, peace enforcement, refugee support operations, and the many other Stability and Support operations, the line between which HUMINT asset was best suited to perform the mission "CI or IPW" has been blurred. This clearly underlines the need for both CI and IPW to work together as a combined team.
c. The solution -- Combine both CI and IPW companies into two CI/HUMINT companies and establish a HUMINT TOC, which integrates both CI/HUMINT Company Operations and the LRS Company Operations Base (COB). A single TOC can better tailor HUMINT support to the warfighter, plan and synchronize HUMINT operations with combat operations, and manage limited HUMINT assets. With this concept in mind, the 14th MI Battalion established the HUMINT TOC (H-TOC) to be the hub for all CI/HUMINT operations in a Corps or JTF area of operations. Under the H-TOC concept, companies continue to provide principle asset management over their teams, while the H-TOC, in conjunction with the Corps Analysis and Control Element (ACE), provides mission management, direction, and control over all assigned assets. With a staff, the H-TOC has the capability to manage support requirements, task organize, surge, and synchronize CI/IPW assets to meet operational requirements.
a. In mid 95, COL Larry Bruns, then the 201st MI Brigade Commander, expressed his concern that the Corps Commander's HUMINT assets within the TEB were not being fully integrated into the intelligence process and not being properly managed. The 14th MI Battalion's HUMINT assets were not automated and lacked an established reporting mechanism to push information in a timely manner into the Corps Analysis and Control Element (ACE). Consequently, the ACE lacked the visibility to effectively conduct HUMINT collection management. In Oct 95, LTC Dennis Barletta, then the 14th MI Battalion Commander, following the Brigade Commander's intent, pulled together, where possible, all company operations to form the HUMINT TOC, in order to deconflict taskings and coordinate requirements of limited HUMINT assets. Additionally, the Brigade set off on a program to automate CI/HUMINT operations. Lockheed Martin's Advanced Technology Laboratories, working under the Defense Advanced Research Programming Agency (DARPA), was brought in to look at the HUMINT automation problem. Two on-going DARPA initiatives were then applied:
(1) Advances in "Intelligent Agent" technology were applied to battlefield intelligence collection and analysis. "Intelligent Agents" are small, mobile computer programs which move from computer to computer and transmit or gather data. With built-in artificial intelligence, these agents are able to spawn "Child-Agents" (mobile sub-programs) which can seek out multiple computers on a battlefield wide area network (WAN) across the Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) Tactical Packet Network (TPN), SINCGARS, and other communication pathways, to search multiple databases at the same time; databases which "Intelligent Agents" believe hold the answers to the analyst's question. Upon discovery of desired information, these "agents" return to the requesting analyst with the answer. Currently "Intelligent Agents" are being used to submit and retrieve intelligence from CI/HUMINT teams using wearable computers and CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Sets (CHATS)2 to intelligence analysts within the ACE, using powerful SUN Sparc WARRIOR/WARLORD workstations.3
The "Intelligent Agent" technology may sound familiar to the capabilities of internet search engines such as "WEBCRAWLER," "LYCOS," or "YAHOO." However, unlike internet search engines where "home pages" are registered with them by submitting a summary statement of "key words" on page content and a link to the pages' locations, today's intelligence databases are generally not arranged in such a manner and consequently each must be independently searched. Using "Intelligence Agents," these databases can be simultaneously searched for content. Additionally, since no directory is available on intelligence database contents, the built-in artificial intelligence of the agents aids them in selecting and searching only those databases most likely to hold the answers. This process greatly saves the analyst's time, who previously searched each database separately or may not have known which database to search and where.
(2) The second initiative was the use of wearable computers by CI/HUMINT soldiers as Tactical Information Assistants (TIA) to speed automation processing capabilities, improve automation mobility and survivability, and reduce automation size and power requirements. The TIA pushes data entry forward to the HUMINT collectors on the ground, allowing them to transmit intelligence information in near-real time from the location of the collection, without having to return to an operating base to process. Additionally, the TIA allows the soldier to pull queries down directly (i.e., a CI soldier conducting CI screening at a refugee control point could query a name on a central CI personalities, installations, and organizations database located miles away from a TIA attached to his web gear). Soldiers using a TIA communicate to a CHATS system located in the CI/HUMINT team's vehicle. Once the transmission from the TIA arrives at the CHATS, it can then be pushed higher via the mounted SINCGARS radio in the team's vehicle. The transmission then enters the Battlefield WAN at either the Operational Management Team (OMT) or Company Operations level.
The current experimental communications link for the TIA is via a 3 pound, handheld SINCGARS radio called a Leprechaun or PRC 6745. The Leprechaun operates in the tactical band (30-80 MHz) and can be switched between frequency hopping and single channel modes. RF output power is selectable from 0.5 to 5 watts.
b. From this beginning the H-TOC concept grew. In Sep 96, LTC Gary Parrish assumed command of the 14th MI Battalion, bringing to it the concept of integrating CI and IPW into two combined CI/HUMINT Companies, and making the H-TOC flexible enough to transition into the nucleus of a JTF J2X and/or an Army Component CI/HUMINT Headquarters for Combined/Joint contingency operations. The 14th MI Battalion's H-TOC concept underwent numerous tests and modifications as it evolved through nine battalion, brigade, and corps level exercises, using both conventional and combined/joint contingency operation scenarios. Portions of the concept were additionally tested at the Joint Readiness Training Center. The results left us with a solid new concept of how to best conduct HUMINT asset management within the Corps and to rapidly collect, process, and disseminate near-real time HUMINT reporting.
14th MI Battalion Organization:
a. At ALO-3 the 14th MI Battalion was organized by current MTOE with four companies containing 10 interrogation teams, 10 counterintelligence teams, 14 long-range surveillance teams, and the Battalion's support elements. Additionally, F Co, 425th Inf, Michigan Army National Guard, was war-traced to the 14th MI Battalion, providing an additional 16 LRS teams. In following with current HUMINT contingency deployment trends, the 14th MI Battalion reorganized internally its CI and IPW companies into two CI/HUMINT companies in order to maximize the operational capabilities of the battalion's CI/HUMINT teams. At ALO 1, this merger provides a Corps or JTF commander with 28 CI/HUMINT teams capable of conducting combined operations as opposed to 12-16 teams capable of conducting either CI or IPW operations, generally not both.
b. CI/HUMINT Force Tailoring: By restructuring, each CI/HUMINT company now could be tailored to meet a variety of CI/HUMINT mission requirements. Each CI/HUMINT Platoon would have two Operational Management Teams (OMT) manned with a CW2/CW3 CI/HUMINT Technician (351B/E), a SSG CI Agent/Interrogator (97B/E), a SGT CI Agent/Interrogator, and two SPC CI Agents/Interrogators. Each OMT would manage two to three CI/HUMINT Operational Teams. The OMT would be capable of plugging into the MI Company Team's Analysis Control Team (ACT) at any tactical brigade or battalion; the ACE at division, corps, or combined/joint element; Rear TOCs or Rear Area Operation Centers (RAOC); or simply operating and managing teams dispersed in General Support (GS). Each operational team (OT) has tailorable manning, varying the ratio of CI:IPW personnel depending on the mission (i.e., a 3:1 ratio for general CI operations and CI investigations; 2:2 ratio for CFSO and CI Screenings; and 1:3 ratio for interrogations and debriefings). Generally, each OT is manned with a WO1/CW2 CI/HUMINT Tech, a SSG CI Agent/Interrogator, a SGT CI Agent/Interrogator, and one to two SPC CI Agents/Interrogators. OT manning is determined during the planning phase of each operation. Once formed, the OT stays together until the conclusion of the operation for which tailored (i.e., an OT formed to support CI screenings at a refugee camp or a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO)). As a rule, teams are not formed to conduct one-day operations. In-depth mission analysis of the OPLAN is conducted jointly between the battalion and companies to determine types of CI/HUMINT missions, operational boundaries, and force tailoring. Figure 2 shows how the 14th MI Battalion converts its MTOE for the CI and IPW Companies at ALO-1 to form combined CI/HUMINT Companies.
a. The nexus of our CI/HUMINT operations is the H-TOC, where the principal CI/HUMINT mission planners and asset managers reside. Each soldier within the H-TOC has a critical mission to execute. They ensure that the collected information is rapidly and accurately processed, analyzed, and disseminated, and that our deployed soldiers are executing the right mission at the right location and have the necessary support to accomplish the assigned task.
Company Operations NCO (E6 97B/E): Information from the OMTs arrives into the H-TOC with the Company Operations NCO, who operates the Company's WARRIOR terminal. The Ops NCO executes the final steps of dissemination outside the Battalion, provided OMTs have not already completed dissemination. The Ops NCO refers critical Force Protection information to the Company Ops Officer for handling procedures. The Ops NCO consolidates and analyzes HUMINT reporting from all company assets, oversees the Ops SITMAP, and develops consolidated products to aid analysis and asset management.
Company Desk NCO (E5 97B/E): Each CI/HUMINT Platoon is assigned a desk NCO both day and night. When reports come into the H-TOC, the Ops NCO pushes the report to the designated Desk NCO, who tracks all HUMINT reporting from the Platoon OMTs. The Desk NCO updates the Ops SITMAP and performs the detailed analysis for the platoon. The Desk NCO uses his CHATS to launch DAIS "Intelligent Agent" queries to gather information to confirm or deny, expand, or mitigate on intelligence reported; aid in identifying other leads; and support CI/HUMINT analysis. When issues arise on reporting or operations, the Desk NCO coordinates the issue between the platoon and the company. The Desk NCO additionally coordinates Platoon source administration with the H-TOC Source Admin Officer.
Company Operations NCOIC (E7 97B/E): Establishes, maintains, and supervises the operations section, and tracks the status of all company assets. The Ops NCOIC oversees the maintenance, logistics, and security of the Company operations.
Company Operations Officer/Technician (O3 35E/W3 351B/E): Manages the Company's operations and assets, and develops the Company plan to support future operations. One critical piece the H-TOC structure allows is that the Co Ops Officers can now conduct face-to-face coordination with sister Company Ops Officers and the H-TOC. This crosstalk is essential to ensuring the consolidated effort of the Battalion in supporting the warfighter. The Ops Officers work together to coordinate and deconflict cross-boundary operations, identify trends and patterns across the Battalion's area of responsibility, and cross-cue each other.
H-TOC HUMINT Operations Technician (W3 351B): Serves as the Battalion Intelligence Contingency Fund (ICF) Custodian and Battalion Source Administration Officer. The HUMINT Ops Tech consolidates Battalion HUMINT reporting into a fused product and tracks and reports HUMINT target nominations and countermeasure recommendations to higher. The HUMINT Ops Tech coordinates Battalion HUMINT reporting and analysis with the ACE HUMINT Single Source Cell and source administration with the C/J2X.
H-TOC Battle Captain (O3 35E): Manages H-TOC operations, manages and tracks all Battalion HUMINT assets, and manages HUMINT taskings. The Battle CPT develops plans to support future operations, as directed by the Bn S-3, and coordinates Battalion movements. With the assistance of the HUMINT Ops Tech and Company Ops Officers, the Battle CPT identifies HUMINT target nominations and countermeasure recommendations. The Battle CPT orchestrates mid-shift operational meetings and shift-change briefings.
Battalion S-3 (O4 35D): Oversees the Battalion's HUMINT mission. The Battalion S-3 is in a position to see the Battalion's entire Operational picture as well as the Corps battle plans. Using this knowledge, the Battalion S-3 lays down the floor plan for synchronizing the Battalion's HUMINT operations to support the friendly scheme of maneuver. The Battalion S-3 serves as the Battalion's HUMINT mission manager for CI and IPW operations. LRS operations are still managed out of the ACE. Additionally, the Bn S-3 oversees and deconflicts HUMINT taskings.
b. When deployed, the H-TOC consists of a primary 2 x 3 Single Integrated Command Post (SICP) configuration with three attached vehicles and a separate 1 x 2 SICP configuration with one attached vehicle for the LRS COB. Two 15kw generators (primary and backup) provide power and all is covered under one camouflage net. One Signal Small Extension Node (SEN) is co-located with the H-TOC to provide MSE connectivity. Figure 3 depicts the H-TOC physical layout and staff positions.
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I): One key piece which has greatly enhanced the efforts of the 14th MI Battalion's concept of operations in C4I was the progress made with Lockheed Martin's Advanced Technology Laboratories in developing "Intelligent Agents" and with MYSTECH for aiding the integration of these "Intelligent Agents" into the WARRIOR/ WARLORD Notebook Intelligence Processing Systems, the All Source Analysis System (ASAS), and the Maneuver Control System-Prototype (MCS-P) (Phoenix). This program is known as the Domain-Adaptive Integration System (DAIS). DAIS, aided by TIA wearable computers, allows CI/HUMINT soldiers to transmit intelligence reports and receive taskings from virtually anywhere on the battlefield. Collecting, processing, and reporting timely battlefield information from CI/HUMINT soldiers to the user (i.e., warfighter) has always been a critical shortcoming. In the past, CI/HUMINT soldiers had to return to an operating base in order to process gathered intelligence. Today, using emerging technology tailored to the tactical, mobile CI/HUMINT soldier, processing collected intelligence can be done from the point of collection.
Domain Adaptive Integration System (DAIS): Transmitting data over current tactical communications had traditionally been a frustrating process, with slow transmission speeds and small bandwidths. DAIS provides the ability to rapidly process, transmit and receive data between multiple systems at the same time. Being compressed in size, DAIS-generated "Intelligent Agents" are able to quickly push through the narrow bandwidths of tactical communications, search large databases on the other end, and return to the user with the requested information. Being "domain adaptive," it can integrate with a variety of different systems over different communication means. Additionally, DAIS has a "fire and forget" capability -- the team can launch a query, lose communications during a movement, and yet find the query results waiting for them when communications are reestablished. Bottom line -- using DAIS means CI/HUMINT intelligence reports transmitted from the deployed team can parse directly into ASAS, thereby reducing processing time and ensuring full integration into the all-source effort. Figure 4 displays the mechanics of how DAIS works.
a. Communications Procedures: Although DAIS answers many of our problems, it does not solve all tactical communications issues. In order to command and control deployed elements and receive reporting, battalion assets must be carefully placed on the battlefield and a good communications overlay prepared in order to ensure good communications. The start point begins with the required locations of deployed teams. From there, communications are pushed to deployed OMTs via SINCGARS. If the deployed team has access to MSE TPN, then that becomes their primary means of communication. Where possible, the OMT deploys to a base cluster with MSE TPN connectivity. In many cases, the base clusters in the Corps rear area with MSE TPN are generally Rear Area Operations Centers (RAOC). The OMT usually co-locates with the RAOC and command and controls two to three teams, all of which are operating in the RAOC's area of responsibility (AOR). The OMTs then communicate with their respective company operations sections located within the H-TOC. If the OMT is unable to maintain communications with deployed teams and company operations, the CI/HUMINT platoon headquarters is capable of establishing a relay for periods of 24 to 48 hours. After 48 hours, platoon operations could degrade as the platoon headquarters is the platoon's principle supplier of logistics. The platoon headquarters generally co-locates with the deployed OMT that is most centrally located to all deployed platoon assets. The H-TOC, located near the Corps Main base cluster, maintains communications with the MI Brigade over SINCGARS, MSE, and the Intel WAN; the Corps ACE over the Intel WAN and MSE; and the Corps or JTF HQ over the Corps/JTF WAN and MSE. Both the Corps and Intel WAN are operated over the MSE TPN. Figure 5 portrays the CI/HUMINT communications process and how an immediate force protection issue is handled.
However, this communications architecture does not imply that the CI/HUMINT soldier must follow this entire chain in order to process an intelligence report on information satisfying a Commander's Critical Information Requirement (CCIR). If, for example, a forward deployed team had just gathered a critical piece of intelligence on the ground, using DAIS the soldier could directly transmit the information to the ACE and simultaneously to any other concerned recipient with WAN connectivity. DAIS makes use of the established communication paths to transmit the information through the quickest link provided. Again, being domain adaptive, DAIS knows which systems are able to talk where. Generally, however, dissemination of intelligence reporting outside of intelligence channels is handled at the OMT level. The OT is authorized to communicate force protection information directly to the concerned unit and supported command.
b. Asset Management: When fully operational, the H-TOC can manage over 70 teams spread across the battlefield. Without automation, keeping track of so many teams could quickly become unmanageable in the heat of battle as team status reports flow in over the radio and are rapidly written into the Ops log and later transposed onto the Ops overlay. However, using automation, teams can be easily tracked and their status disseminated and displayed in such a way that leaders can ensure these assets are positioned to best provide the maneuver commander with CI/HUMINT support. Using DAIS, the battalion's assets submit status reports twice daily or whenever the team has a change in mission, location, or operational status. The report is automatically transmitted through their command channels to the H-TOC, where it is processed into a central Resource Status Report (RSR) database loaded on the H-TOC WARRIOR. The H-TOC uses the WARRIOR to graphically enhance the RSR database by plotting team locations onto a digitized map. The current enemy situation database and/or SALUTE database is then plotted over the top of the RSR database, revealing areas where teams may be in danger of surrounding enemy activity. This capability provides the asset manager with an immediate visualization of the current situation and aids in making a quick decision on whether to redirect the endangered team to safer ground or increasing protective measures inplace. From the H-TOC, the consolidated RSR is automatically updated and published on the Intel WAN. The RSR is then viewed by the Battalion Administration and Logistics Center (ALOC), where the Battalion S-1 and S-4 look over the RSR to anticipate supply shortages and repair parts, dispatch a maintenance contact team, or initiate casualty reporting and requisition replacement personnel as required. If the Battalion S-1 or S-4 do not receive a formal requisition or casualty feeder report, they then know to remind the companies of the necessary actions. Additionally, the RSR is forwarded to the HUMINT Collection Manager located in the ACE, who looks at the asset dispersion to identify gaps in collection coverage and determine mission taskings. Figure 6 depicts this process and a sample display of the output.
"Hot-Linked" RSR overlay: Not all asset managers and leaders who need the RSR overlay have access to a WARRIOR where they can view it. OMTs, for instance, have access to the RSR database but currently do not have the capability to graphically display the data as an overlay. To overcome this problem, the H-TOC produces the RSR overlay as a HTML ImageMap or "hot-linked" map that is published on the Intel WAN and can then be pulled up with a standard PC or CHATS for the OMTs and OTs to access. The "hot-linked" overlay, similar to the WARRIOR display, allows an operator to click on displayed icons and read the associated text in a pop-up window. The icons are "hot-linked" to the database entries that produced them.
CI/HUMINT Support to Force Protection: Whether conducting liaison, a Threat/ Vulnerability Assessment (TVA), or a HUMINT collection operation, the focal point for most CI/HUMINT operations is providing support to Force Protection. There are three critical pieces to this support mission on which we focus:
a. Know the Threat: The development of a MDCI Estimate is critical prior to any deployment. Once contingency areas are identified, the HUMINT Single Source Cell within the ACE begins developing and maintaining these products. As the Battalion OPLAN develops, OMTs and OTs aid HUMINT Single Source in gathering information on the AO. The turf is broken down and CI/HUMINT teams work to become subject matter experts on the customs, culture, government, and geography of their given areas. Once in the contingency area, conducting liaison is always the first step. Without the initial preparation to gain knowledge of the area, the team would be incapable of "hitting the ground running" and making the initial liaison contacts required to quickly assess the threat to the force. We look to identify and maintain contact with host nation law enforcement, intelligence, and security agencies; Private Volunteer Organizations (PVO) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO); and allied counterparts. Through this liaison the development of CI Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO) occurs. CFSO operations provide Indications and Warnings (I&W) of potential threats to JTF Forces.
b. Know your Vulnerabilities: Once the threat has been established, the CI/HUMINT teams move their focus toward conducting Threat/Vulnerability Assessments (TVA) on critical JTF assets and potential enemy targets. The identification of friendly critical assets is derived from determining what the JTF Commander considers as his centers of gravity and those assets that compose and support it. Some traditional critical assets include C3 nodes, logistics sites, aviation and ADA assets, and counterfire radars. The TVA analyzes all the aspects of physical security, personnel security, information security, and communications security. The TVA measures the current threat capabilities against emplaced security measures and operating procedures to identify vulnerabilities. Again, without the previous research in identifying the threat and in conducting liaison, the team would be incapable of making a valid identification of vulnerabilities.
c. Provide Countermeasures: Providing valid countermeasures is often a difficult task to strike the right balance of security with the given assets and environment. Too restrictive of security measures rapidly degrades operational sustainment and in SASO operations builds distrust in the people we are trying to protect as we continue to throw barriers between us and them. Too lax of security measures provides the enemy with his target of opportunity and forces the JTF to pay for a costly mistake in the loss of lives, material, and status in the world's eye. Providing predictive intelligence coupled with valid countermeasures is the apex of CI/HUMINT support to force protection. One tool that we have used with good success in providing predictive intelligence is the 24-hour time-event chart. The 24-hour time-event chart graphically depicts incident reporting on a 24-hour clock chart. Over the span of a couple days, the chart displays the enemy's operational patterns. From this pattern, the analyst can determine enemy sleep cycles, movement, and attack times, aiding the analyst in predicting enemy activities over the next 24 hours. Countermeasures can then be applied to avoid enemy contact on unfavorable grounds and increase defense measures during most likely times of enemy attacks. The 24-hour time-event chart is depicted at Figure 7.
CI/HUMINT Analysis: The determination of where principal CI/HUMINT analysis lies remains an issue. Doctrinally, CI/HUMINT analysis is the responsibility of the HUMINT Single Source Cell within the ACE, who integrates this information into ASAS and extracts from ASAS a "complete" HUMINT picture. However, our HUMINT reporting from the OTs was unable to ever fully portray all the complex linkages of personalities and activities required to give HUMINT Single Source the same visibility as the teams on the ground. The OMTs enhanced this process by debriefing deployed OTs, compiling and analyzing the data from each team, and feeding it into their respective company operations element within the H-TOC. Company operations consolidated the analytical products from each OMT and further refined the analytical effort by conducting detailed CI analysis. The H-TOC worked to synchronize the analytical efforts of each company operations, identifying cross boundary linkages, and consolidating the analysis into one HUMINT picture for the entire Corps' AOR. A summary of this product was then pushed to HUMINT Single Source and published on the Corps Intel WAN twice daily. Other HUMINT products developed by the operations cells of the H-TOC, including association matrixes, link diagrams, and time-event charts, were also pushed to the ACE. HUMINT Single Source then used these products to identify other linkages, patterns, and trends with subordinate divisions, adjacent corps, and at the theater and national levels. HUMINT Single Source then published a detailed analysis on the Corps Intel WAN within the Corps INTSUM and in the form of Multidiscipline Counterintelligence (MDCI) Summaries and Threat Assessments. Our experience with CI/HUMINT analysis showed the H-TOC conducting the bulk of the CI/HUMINT analytical effort, HUMINT Target nominations, and countermeasure recommendations. HUMINT Single Source worked more as an ASAS plug, gathering other outside sources of intelligence to support the H-TOC's analytical efforts, and cross-cueing our HUMINT operations with the other intelligence disciplines. Prior to the 14th MI Battalion's inactivation, the 201st MI Brigade considered attaching HUMINT Single Source to the 14th MI Battalion to further enhance this unity of effort, yet leaving them physically located within the ACE to maintain connectivity with ASAS and full integration into the all-source process. The HUMINT Single Source Cell, due primarily to its access to other databases in the ACE, remains a critical piece to CI/HUMINT and the overall intelligence effort. The Force XXI Battlefield is a multi-dimensional spectrum. Separate dimensions operating simultaneously require a nexus for cross-cueing to reduce conflicts and to complete the necessary analysis to orchestrate a plan to develop the synergy necessary to gain Information Dominance on the modern battlefield. Additionally, HUMINT Single Source also has access to the other intelligence disciplines (SIGINT, IMINT, OSINT) up to national and theater level and the requisite experience to be the catalyst for creating the synergy. Properly focused, HUMINT Single Source weaves the divergent threads into a single tapestry and presents the warfigher with an accurate picture.
In addition to fighting as a Corps TEB, the HUMINT Battalion's structure is versatile enough to transition into a J2X for a Joint Task Force (JTF) contingency operation. A Joint Task Force J2X serves as the controlling authority for CI/HUMINT operations in a theater of operations. The J2X coordinates and deconflicts CI/HUMINT requirements and taskings between the services. Containing a robust C2 structure, the HUMINT Battalion is capable of transitioning its H-TOC into the nucleus of a J2X, but requires service augmentation to control the myriad of joint CI/HUMINT collectors operating in support of the JTF Commander. By integrating the three to four soldier Corps G-2 CI Section, the H-TOC also forms the Task Force CI Coordinating Authority (TFCICA) portion of the J2X. The HUMINT Battalion can also plug in OMTs, as required, to form the U.S. Army Sub Control Office (SCO) for controlling Army CI investigations in theater, and to form or augment the CI Analysis Section (CIAS) within the TFCICA. The CIAS is primarily composed of the four-soldier HUMINT Single Source cell from the Corps ACE. Still leaving sufficient C2 power, A Co can establish the JTF Joint Interrogation Facility while B Co forms the US ARFOR CI/HUMINT HQ. Figure 8 depicts the integration of the HUMINT MI Battalion into the J2X.
Fighting as a part of Force XXI requires a CI/HUMINT organization that is versatile enough that it can be tailored to support various combined, joint, and unilateral contingency operations. A Corps HUMINT Battalion can provide the tactical command, control, communications, and information structure that is versatile and capable of satisfying the commander's CI/HUMINT requirements in all Force XXI operations. Recent military operations, to include Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, clearly demonstrate that CI/HUMINT is today's intelligence discipline of choice. It is the discipline best suited to provide intelligence and force protection support against the ill-defined threat of stability and support operations. In order to remain the discipline of choice into the 21st century, CI/HUMINT must continue to enhance its capabilities and versatility, adapting to the emerging requirements of Force XXI. This document presents the 14th MI Battalion's concept of operations for tactical and operational CI/HUMINT Support to Force XXI.
For further information, contact CW2 Neater, 14th MI Bn, Coml 253-967-2272/4191, DSN 357-2272/4191.
1. Douglas H. Dearth, "Information War: Rethinking the Application of Power in the 21st Century," Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, January-March 1997 Issue.
2. CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set (CHATS): An intelligence data processing system designed for the mobile CI/HUMINT Team. Consists of two hardened cases. Case #1 is equipped with a built-in 6 hr. battery pack and 110-240 volt power converter that supplies power to a notebook Pentium computer and accessories. The computer also comes with an ethernet LAN and FAX/MODEM card. Additionally contained within case #1 is a Kodak DC50 digital camera, Canon BJC-70 color printer, and full page color scanner. All accessories are wired internally within the case. Case #2 contains an international power and phone adapter set, screw driver set, power strip, and other required cables. Software includes Windows 95, MS Office Pro 95, Netscape 3.0, ProComm Plus, and PhotoSuite, all burned onto a disaster recovery CD-ROM.
3. WARRIOR/WARLORD System: A SUN SPARC workstation designed to process, database, and disseminate intelligence information. The WARRIOR is being upgraded to the newer system called the WARLORD Notebook (WLNB). The WLNB comes as either a SUN SPARC workstation or as a PENTIUM laptop.
HUMINT TTP Glossary and Definitions