Daily Press Briefing for September 28, 2005 - IRAN - Transcript - Sean McCormack, Spokesman - Washington, DC
*************QUESTION: What's your reaction to the protests in Iran around the British Embassy? This is a reaction to the IAEA vote, I presume, were there to be a U.S. embassy, they would be protesting there.
MR. MCCORMACK: Right. Well, I'll leave it to those on the ground to describe the protests there and who might be organizing those protests. The position where Iran finds itself right now, I think, is one that is probably a surprise to them after the IAEA Board of Governors vote. And where they find themselves is more isolated from the international community than when they started. And I think you can really trace back the point at which they started to further isolate themselves in the most recent sense to the Iranian President's speech before the General Assembly and their failure to field any ground whatsoever in the run-up to the Board of Governors' vote. The EU-3 as well as other members of the Board of Governors urged the Iranians to return to the negotiating table, to cooperate with the IAEA, to answer those outstanding questions that the international community has regarding Iran's nuclear programs and what we say is their pursuit of nuclear weapons under the cover of a civilian nuclear program. So what we have now is a statement of finding of noncompliance of Iran with their international obligations. Iran now has an opportunity. They have an opportunity in the coming days, weeks and months to return to the negotiations with the EU-3, engage in those negotiations in a constructive manner and also to cooperate with the IAEA. There will be a report from the IAEA to the Security Council and what is in that report, describing Iran's actions and the state of the cooperation with the international community will be up to Iran. We'll see if they decide to cooperate. We'll see if they decide to return to negotiations. But what the Iranian Government heard was a very clear message from the international community and that message was that the international community does not want Iran to obtain nuclear weapons. That would be a destabilizing action and they also made it very clear they don't think that Iran should have -- because of its past behavior, access to sensitive nuclear fuel cycles. So we'll see. We'll see what the coming days and weeks brings, but it really is up to Iran in terms of their actions and what they do and what is contained in that report to the Security Council. Yes.
QUESTION: You are not afraid that Iran could radicalize its position and leave or stop cooperating with the IAEA altogether?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, what we've seen is that the defiant Iranian attitudes towards the international community has gotten to the point where they find themselves now, and that is further isolated than when they began. They were in negotiations with the EU-3. The EU-3 was engaged in those negotiations in good faith, trying to resolve the issue. And that issue concerns Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, so we'll see what Iran -- what actions Iran does and what attitude that they have. But I think that what the international community has seen through this speech at the United Nations, as well as in its subsequent actions, is really the true face of this new government and so we'll see. We'll see what Iran does in the coming days and weeks. We urge them to return to the negotiating table and to negotiate with the IAEA and to cooperate with the IAEA.
QUESTION: The situation here is that being cornered may contribute to a situation where they strike out even more radically than they would have otherwise. For instance, they're threatening to proceed with enrichment of uranium. And yesterday a former top State Department official has said that there's some belief within the administration they've actually begun that, buying technology around the world. Aren't you concerned that if cornered, Iran might be even more dangerous? I don't want to draw parallels, you know, too soon, but you know, you've begun to speak soothingly to North Korea and stopped beating on their heads and -- I mean, the State Department -- and maybe it paid dividends, maybe it didn't. I think the suggestion or the question -- (inaudible) the same thought, is isn't there some concern here that Iran is being cornered and isolated? Doesn't that have a bad -- couldn't that have bad results?
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
(a) Recalling the resolutions adopted by the Board on 11 August 2005 (
(b) Recalling that Article IV of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stipulates that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty,
(c) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement in
(d) Recalling Iran's failures in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 214) with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, its processing and its use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material had been processed and stored, as reported by the Director General in his report
(e) Recalling also that, as deplored by the Board in its resolution
(f) Recalling that the Director General in his report to the Board on
(g) Noting that, as reported by the Director General, the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important outstanding issues after two and a half years of intensive inspections and investigation and that Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue,
(h) Uncertain of Iran's motives in failing to make important declarations over an extended period of time and in pursuing a policy of concealment up to October 2003,
(i) Concerned by continuing gaps in the Agency's understanding of proliferation sensitive aspects of
(j) Recalling the emphasis placed in past resolutions on the importance of confidence building measures and that past resolutions have reaffirmed that the full and sustained implementation of the suspension notified to the Director General on 14 November 2004, as a voluntary, non legally binding confidence building measure, to be verified by the Agency, is essential to addressing outstanding issues,
(k) Deploring the fact that Iran has to date failed to heed the call by the Board in its resolution of 11 August 2005 to re-establish full suspension of all enrichment related activities including the production of feed material, including through tests or production at the Uranium Conversion Facility,
(l) Also concerned that Iran has to date failed to heed repeated calls to ratify the Additional Protocol and to reconsider its decision to construct a research reactor moderated by heavy water, as these measures would have helped build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of
(m) Noting that the Director General reported that the Agency continues to follow up on information pertaining to
(n) Endorsing the Director General's description of this as a special verification case, and
(o) Noting that the Agency is still not in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in
1. Finds that Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in
2. Finds also that the history of concealment of
3. Requests the Director General to continue his efforts to implement this and previous Resolutions and to report again, including any further developments on the issues raised in his report of
4. In order to help the Director General to resolve outstanding questions and provide the necessary assurances, urges
(i) To implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General in his report, which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military owned workshops and research and development locations;
(ii) To re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related activity, as in
(iii) To reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water;
(iv) Promptly to ratify and implement in full the Additional Protocol;
(v) Pending completion of the ratification of the Additional Protocol to continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol, which
5. Calls on
6. Requests the Director General to continue his efforts to implement the Agency's Safeguards Agreement with Iran, to implement provisionally the Additional Protocol to that Agreement, and to pursue additional transparency measures required for the Agency to be able to reconstruct the history and nature of all aspects of Iran's past nuclear activities, and to compensate for the confidence deficit created; and
7. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
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INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
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September 24–25, 2005
Statement by the Hon. DAVOUD DANESH JA’FARI,
Governor of the Bank for the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN,
at the Joint Annual Discussion
[EXCERPT] Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Governors
Now let me bring to your kind attention the latest developments in my country. The Islamic Republic of Iran has pursued the economic and social and reform strategies within the framework of the country's Development Plans. In this regard a package of reform policies were implemented in the context of the third 5 year development plan during the period of 2000/04 and many considerable and significant results have been achieved.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has the second largest population in MENA region. Most of them are young with increasing expectations of a better life and future. There are also a large number of well – educated women seeking opportunities to partake in different areas of economic and social activities. Despite significant progress in the country’s activities for poverty reduction and human development, creating enough job opportunity to meet the new flows into labor market along with extensive reduction of unemployment is required. In order to overcome this problem, high and sustainable economic growth with enough employment opportunities should be ensured. We strongly believe that economic development can not be achieved unless, attractive investment climate and broader participation of private sector in the economy is provided and promoted. In the same line the strategic policies deduced from the article 44 of the constitution implying the boundaries and areas of performance of state-owned, cooperative and private entities were elaborated and specified by the government. In these new introduced policies, the ground is paved for more private sector involvement in different economic and financial activities, specially in those areas that previously was monopolized by the Government.
Therefore the legislative framework for contribution of the private sector in different areas of activity such as heavy industry, banking, insurance, power supply, communications and transportation sector is provided.
Greater transparency in the macroeconomic regime, budget reforms, tax reforms, unification of foreign exchange rate, downsizing the government's role in economic activities through privatization of SOEs, dismantling of monopolies and promoting competitive market, reducing the non-tariff trade barriers, adopting smart and targeted subsides, attracting foreign investments and protecting private sector investment, establishing private commercial banks to pave the ground for privatization of state-owned banks and developing an effective social security system are the evidence to the Government of Iran's commitment to implement structural reforms within the framework of the third five year Development Plan. These employed reforms and programs together with strong macroeconomic performance, have caused an average t growth rate of around 5.5 percent during the period of the third development plan, which is the one the highest in the region. In addition the unemployment rate is dropping continuously reaching 10.3 percent last year.
By reaching the end of the third development plan in 2004, the fourth five year development plan was ratified six months ago. In fact this Plan in compliance with the objectives set by Twenty Year Economic Vision Document of the country, draw the guidelines and specifies the framework for the new government policies and approaches. Achieving the continuous increasing and sustainable economic growth, providing the ground for the competitiveness of goods and services in local and foreign market, promoting non-oil exports, extending efforts for shifting the growth structure toward the knowledge economy are some of the major highlights of the economic approach of the fourth five year development plan.
I would like to emphasize that while the new government is very much committed, to the said 20 years Economic Vision Document and the Development Plan, one of the most important priority of the government is the issue of expansion of Equity in the society by economic and social means, by providing for example, equal job opportunities, education, health and social activities, in order to reduce the Gini Index . Furthermore, anticorruption campaign will also be implemented more forcefully.
Mr. Chairman, Dear Governors Ladies and Gentlemen
At the end I should express my appreciation to the World Bank management and staff for their extraordinary work and commitment. There is no doubt that in case of my country with a growing portfolio, the dedication and relentless efforts of the Bank's management and staff have played a crucial and significant role. In fact we consider the World Bank as an important center for synthesis of expertise, views and experiences in a global scale to illuminate the development gateway.
Speaker: Peter Jenkins, UK Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and United Nations organisations in Vienna
IAEA Board of Governors, 21 September 2005: EU Presidency Statement on Iran
TEXT of U.S. Briefing on Iran Nuclear Program
Nuclear Energy or Nuclear Weapons?
1. Confirmed record of hiding sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities from the IAEA.
4. Moreover, indigenous fuel cycle costs are substantially greater than importing nuclear fuel at market prices or taking full advantage of its current wasted hydrocarbon resources.
Fuel Cycle Rationalization
· Iranian Vice-President and Atomic Energy Minister Aghazadeh, May 2003
2. The best use that a country like mine can make out of its uranium ores is to replace oil as a primary source of energy within two decades most of our oil production will be consumed internally, leaving nothing tangible for export.
· Iranian Representative to the IAEA, Ambassador Salehi, March 2003
Irans Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities: Concealment & Deception
A History of Concealment & Deception
1. Long-standing IAEA safeguards violations show that
· Apart from contamination, the full extent of centrifuge research and development;
· The full extent of plutonium experimentation;
· Military involvement in any nuclear activity.
NUCLEAR FACILITY IMAGES: Sites Unknown before 2002
1. Lashcar Abad: Uranium Enrichment Facility
5. Natanz: Uranium Enrichment Facility
6. Ardekan: Uranium Processing Facility
7. Gachin: Uranium Processing Facility
8. Gachin: Uranium Mines
4. Saghand: Uranium Mines
5. Bushehr: Light Water Reactor
Natanz Gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment Complex
1. Covert facility in remote location, could enrich uranium for weapons
2. Dummy structures to prevent detection and identification
3. Concealed underground, hardened, well defended
1. June 2004-March 2005, significant progress on Heavy Water plant construction
· Full production of primary line planned for 2005
2. Despite IAEA Board request to forgo construction,
· Reactor is well underway and progressing rapidly.
Clandestine Uranium Mine & Mill Still Under IIAEA Investigation
2. DDGs June Oral Statement reiterated that the Agency seeks to better understand the complex arrangements governing the current and past administration of the mine. Possible Military Involvement?
3. IAEA investigating why the work on the very promising [Gachin] project was suspended by the AEOI from 1994 to 2000 while
Iranian Government Misrepresented Uranium Mine
Mine M_26_13 is located at the Gachin Uranium Mill but is listed only as the Sandrasang mine near the
1. Alternate investments in natural gas or oil refining would be more attractive.
Estimated Fuel Cycle Costs
Capital costs of selected nuclear facilities (
1. The role of economies of scale not clear in the Iranian nuclear program.
2. Additional developmental hurdles unclear, such as with the fuel fabrication plant.
Attractive Alternatives to Investing in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Benefit of Recovering Wasted Gas In 2002,
· Approximate investment = $2.5 billion
· Savings equivalent to:
1. $1.6 billion (Market price 7.78$/MMBtu)3
2. 2.8 Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant equivalents4
· Approximate investment = $3.2 billion
· Savings equivalent to:
1. $2.22 billion (Market price 7.78$/MMBtu)3
3. 3.9 Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant equivalents4
1, 2 Data From
3 Market Price
4 Replacement for CCTG Plants - 7200 BTU/kw-hr heat rate, 85% capacity factor, 1070BTU/ft3 natural gas
Benefits of Gasoline Production Upgrade
Comparative Nuclear Fuel Costs for 7000 Megawatts: Indigenous Vs. Market
The Myth of Nuclear Fuel Self Sufficiency
Setting economics aside, even if speculative uranium deposits in Iran are assumed and included, Iran is not close to possessing sufficient uranium to fuel seven 1000 MWe for their lifetime. It is thus impossible for
Limited Uranium Resources
1. Known uranium (1,427) + speculative (13,850) = 15,277 tons U
2. Assume Bushehr burns 22 tons of LEU annually
Fuel Resource Constraints 2006-2026
1. Known uranium will be exhausted by 2010 with only two operational reactors.
2. Total uranium resources will be depleted by 2023 with all reactors far short of their 40 year design lifetime.
Which Resource [is] Truly Scarce?
· 125.8 billion barrels proven reserves
· Roughly 10% of world total
2. Natural Gas
· 940 trillion cubic feet proven reserves
· Worlds 2nd largest supply, 15.5% world total
Energy equivalence used = 1070 BTU/ft3 natural gas, 5.8e6 BTU/barrel oil, 11,000 BTU/lb. coal, 4.41e11 BTU/mton U-235. Source Nuclear Engineering: Theory and Technology of Commercial Nuclear Power Knief. Energy data from March 2005
Nuclear Energy or Nuclear Weapons?
Extensive Concealment and Deception Record
1. Once revealed,
· Nuclear energy independence not feasible given ore reserves
· Importing nuclear fuel
· Reducing waste of natural gas currently flared
· Increasing gasoline production for domestic energy independence
Uranium Reserves: Only Enough for Weapons
Comparing Nuclear Infrastructures
1. Uranium mining Both States have limited known domestic reserves (
2. UF6 Conversion Both states seek a 200 ton/year production capacity
Comparing Delivery Capabilities
2. Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) derived from the DPRKs No Dong